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Abstract: This paper presents a model of two countries competing for a pool of
students from the rest of the world (ROW). In equilibrium, one country oers high
educational quality for high tuition fees, while the other country provides a low
quality and charges low fees. The quality in the high quality country, the tuition
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erential between the countries increase with
the income prospects in ROW and the number of international students. Higher stay
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11 Motivation
Higher education has become increasingly internationalised over the last decades.
On the demand side, talented students increasingly aim at receiving an excellent
education as a sound basis for future careers, even if this requires being interna-
tionally mobile and studying abroad. In particular, many students from developing
countries consider a degree from a university in a developed country as a chance to
enhance their career prospects at home and abroad. On the supply side, university
programmes in developed countries increasingly accommodate the needs of foreign
students in order to attract international talent. As a result, the number of inter-
national students (i.e., students enrolled outside their country of citizenship) has
grown considerably over the last thirty years, and this growth has been accelerated
in recent years. Since 2000, the number of foreign students within OECD countries
has increased by more than 50%. Asia is by far the largest sending region. Students
from China and India alone constitute 15.4% and 5.4% of the students from OECD
partner countries enrolled within the OECD (see OECD, 2008, chapter 3).
In the host countries, the perceived benets from foreign students are diverse, en-
compassing, for instance, additional revenues from tuition fees and positive spillovers
to domestic students, the university and the society as a whole.1 Importantly, the
acquisition of international students also re
ects a long-term strategy to increase the
future number of skilled workers in the domestic economy, as many of the foreign
talent will continue to stay in their host countries after graduation (see, e.g., Dreher
and Poutvaara, forthcoming; Finn, 2003; Lowell, Bump and Martin, 2007; Rosen-
zweig, 2006). Recent measures of several OECD countries to promote the access of
international students to the domestic labour market indicates that countries are
aware of this option (see, e.g., Chalo and Lemaitre, 2009; Tremblay, 2005).
However, the supply of talent is limited, and ability varies substantially among
international students. This gives rise to an intense competition between developed
countries for the international pool of talent. Also, changes in the socio-economic
environment will continue to transform this competition. Notably, the size of the
pool of talent from developing countries will continue to grow over the next decades.
At the same time, the share of international students who stay in their host country
after graduation (i.e., the `stay rate') is very likely to change too. Finally, major
sending countries, such as China and India, will continue to catch up with the
developed countries and provide better income prospects for graduates who return
1See, for example, Throsby (1991, 1998) for some cost-benet considerations in the context of
foreign student enrollment.
1to these countries.
The aim of our paper is to analyse the competition between developed countries
for the pool of talent from developing countries and its implications. In particular, we
explore how the aforementioned changes in the socio-economic environment will alter
the outcome of this international competition. This analysis will not only provide
some hints about future trends in the developed countries, but also shed new light
on the discussion of brain drain and brain gain.
We apply a model with duopolistic competition and vertical product dieren-
tiation.2 Two developed countries compete for a pool of students from developing
countries. These two host countries non-cooperatively choose educational quality
and tuition fees. They aim at maximising their net benet from educating foreign
students, which includes future tax payments of those who continue to stay in the
host country. In equilibrium, one country oers a high-quality education at high
tuition fees and attracts the brightest students, while the other country provides a
lower quality education at low tuition fees and receives the less talented students.
More interestingly, educational quality, tuition fees and the allocation of stu-
dents responds sensitively to changes in the socio-economic environment, i.e., to an
increase in the size of the talent pool, the stay rate and the income prospects for
graduates who return to their home countries in the developing world. All three
changes unambiguously increase the quality of education in the high-quality coun-
try and widen the quality gap between the two host countries. In contrast, the
conclusions about tuition fees are less clear-cut. Both an enlarged pool of talent and
enhanced income prospects for returning graduates raise the tuition fees in the two
countries and the tuition fee dierential. A higher stay rate of students in their host
countries after graduation leads to ambiguous results. In this case, the tuition fees
in both countries and the tuition fee dierential can decline. Finally, a higher stay
rate implies that a larger share of international students end up in the high-quality
country. By contrast, in the case of rising income prospects for graduates in the
developing world, and only in this case, the allocation of students can shift in favour
of the low-quality country.
This paper also suggests new mechanisms that cause brain drain or brain gain.
The policy responses of the developed countries to an increase in the stay rate and
2Models of oligopolistic competition with vertically dierentiated products are frequently used
in the literature on industrial organisation. Seminal papers include, for instance, Gabszewicz and
Thisse (1979) and Shaked and Sutton (1982). A recent application of this type of model to public
economics is Zissimos and Wooders (2008). They analyse competition for rms by means of tax
policy and the provision of public goods that reduce production costs.
2the size of the talent pool unambiguously yield a qualitative brain gain. That is,
the average human capital of the returning graduates increases. However, a larger
stay rate also leads to a quantitative brain drain, as fewer students return to the
developing regions.
Our analysis contributes to the literature on higher education policy and inter-
national competition for mobile students. For instance, Del Rey (2001) analyses the
impact of economic integration on public education when students are internation-
ally mobile and foreign students return to their home country after graduation. She
nds that countries tend to underinvest in public education to discourage foreign
students from free-riding on the domestic education system. Demange and Fenge
(2010) explore competition between two countries for students in a model with ver-
tically dierentiated educational quality levels. There is no free-riding of foreign
students because universities are completely fee-nanced. Nevertheless, competition
for students yields inecient equilibria as long as not all students return to their
home country. The underlying reason is that attracting foreign students who at least
partly continue to stay in their host country after graduation implies a negative ex-
ternality for the country of origin.
Our contribution diers from these papers in two ways. Firstly, we analyse com-
petition in both tuition fees and quality of education, while both Del Rey (2001) and
Demange and Fenge (2010) consider quality competition only. Expanding the policy
space allows us to show, for instance, that quality levels and tuition fees can move
in opposite directions if the stay rate of foreign students after graduation increases.
Secondly, we analyse how the non-cooperative quality levels and tuition fees vary
with changes in the socio-economic environment, while the papers referred to above
focus on exploring the welfare properties of non-cooperative equilibria. Thirdly, con-
sidering explicitly a pool of students from developing countries, we can derive some
conclusions about the impact of international competition for talent on brain drain
and brain gain.3
Kemnitz (2007a) analyses how dierent funding schemes and dierent degrees of
3Several further papers cover the eects of student mobility on education systems in a dier-
ent but related context. For instance, B uttner and Schwager (2004), H ubner (2009), and Kemnitz
(2007b) analyse the implications of student mobility for the education policy within a federation.
These contributions show how dierent institutional arrangements and degrees of decentralisa-
tion aect the eciency of education policy and the distribution of gains and costs. Hoyt and
Jensen (2001) explains why two competing cities|each of them aiming at maximising its house
prices|oer dierent qualities of public schooling. De Fraja and Iossa (2002) analyse under which
circumstances two competing universities which are located in dierent cities dier in their admis-
sion standards and research budgets.
3university autonomy aect the competition between educational institutions when
universities care about research budgets and teaching output. He applies a model
with vertical product dierentiation in which tuition fees and educational quality are
endogenously determined, similar to the one we use. However, he considers a closed
economy, while we focus on international competition for students when education
policy is used to lure students into the country. Thus, the questions we raise, such
as the eect of a higher stay rate on quality levels and tuition fees, are naturally not
part of his analysis, although the underlying model types are similar.4
Our paper also contributes to the literature on brain drain and brain gain (e.g.,
Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, 2008; Eggert, Krieger and Meier, 2010; Stark, Hel-
menstein and Prskawetz, 1997, 1998; Stark and Wang, 2002; Vidal, 1998). This
literature stresses that international mobility reinforces private incentives to invest
in education, and thus might increase human capital in developing countries. By
contrast, we show how socio-economic changes aect the education policy in the
host countries of students from developing countries, and how this might increase
human capital in developing countries.
Our paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we set up the basic model. Section
3 analyses the competition between the two host countries for the international pool
of talent. It characterises the resulting subgame-perfect equilibrium. In Section 4, we
explain how socio-economic changes shape education policies and student allocation
in equilibrium. Section 5 discusses the implications for the stock of human capital in
developing countries, and sketches the welfare eects of international competition.
In Section 6, we provide some concluding remarks.
2 Governments and International Students
In this section, we set the stage for the analysis of the competition between two
developed host countries for international students. We apply a duopoly model with
vertical product dierentiation. That is, two host countries oer dierent qualities
of higher education and charge dierent tuition fees. We start by exploring student
4Like Kemnitz (2007), Grazzini, Luporini and Petretto (2010) explore competition between
universities within a jurisdiction. In their framework, multiple equilibria exists: universities might
specialise in teaching or research, and high ability students might sort themselves to a dierent
university as their low-ability counterparts. Furthermore, Boadway, Marceau and Marchand (1996)
explore the competition between private schools. They show that this competition typically leads
to inecient outcomes.
4characteristics and the expected income that results from migrating to, and study-
ing in, one of the host countries. Afterwards, we discuss the host countries' policy
instruments and their objectives. Finally, we present the timing of the decisions.
International Students The size of the international student population is ex-
ogenous and denoted by N. It represents the total demand from the Rest-of-the-
World (ROW) for education in two ex ante identical host countries 1 and 2. Each
of these ROW students studies in one of the two host countries. More precisely,
this `pool of international talent' can be considered as the student population from
developing countries who enrol at universities in developed countries.
The ROW students dier in their ability, denoted by a. The ability a is uniformly
distributed over the unit interval, i.e., a 2 [0;1]. It captures the capacity to exploit
the quality of higher education, as re
ected by their future gross wage. This future
gross wage w consists of a `graduate' base salary w and an educational quality
premium aqi, where qi  0 denotes the quality of education the individual receives
in the host country i, i = 1;2. That is, w = w+aqi. Ability and university quality are
complementary in the production of the educational quality premium. The resulting
labour income is taxed at the exogenous rate  2 [0;1] in each of the developed
countries 1 and 2. In contrast to those who continue to stay in their host country
and earn gross wage w, the individuals who return to their native ROW country
earn gross wage 
w, 
 2 [0;1], which is taxed at the exogenous rate ROW 2 [0;1].
Although labour incomes in the developed host countries usually exceed those
in ROW (and we will assume that this is the case), there are usually non-economic
reasons for foreign students to return to their home countries after graduation.
Examples for such motives are failure of social integration in the host country,
private and family ties to the country of origin, homesickness, problems with regard
to the change of status from student to permanent immigrant in the host country, or
labour market frictions.5 These non-economic motives are captured by an exogenous
repatriation rate (1   p). That is, with probability p individuals stay in their host
country after graduation and receive a net wage (1 )w. With probability (1 p),
they return to their native country and earn net wage (1   ROW)
w.
When migrating, individuals already anticipate that they will stay on in the host
country only with probability p; however, information on whether they belong to
5See, for example, Baruch, Budhwar and Khatri (2007) for a questionnaire survey on return/non-
return determinants of foreign students in the US and the UK.
5the group of repatriates is only revealed after graduation.6 Thus, the expected net
labour income of a graduate with ability a is
Efwag = %(w +aqi); where % := %(p;
) = p(1 )+(1 p)(1 ROW)
 > 0: (1)
As the two host countries represent the developed parts of the world, and as
ROW stands for the developing region, the net labour income of a graduate in
ROW never exceeds that in the developed countries:
Assumption 1 (1   )   (1   ROW)
  0.
This assumption implies that staying in the host country after graduation is
benecial on pure income grounds. Only non-economic motives induce graduates to
return to their native country with probability p, as discussed above. This economic
attractiveness of the developed host countries creates the asymmetry between send-
ing and receiving countries which is typical for brain drain models. Furthermore,
we assume that the `graduate' base salary w is sucient to make studying abroad
benecial for all individuals in the `pool of talent'. That is, we consider a market for
higher education that is completely covered.
Governments The government of each host country sets its tuition fees for higher
education ti and the quality of education qi. Providing educational quality causes
variable costs per student c(qi) = qi,  2 [0;1], and xed costs F(qi), where F(qi)
is a twice continuously dierentiable function with @F=@qi > 0, @2F=@q2
i > 0 and
F(0) = 0. Tuition fees do not necessarily cover these costs, and need not be positive,
as a country might subsidise international students.
6We ignore the possibility that a foreign-born graduate moves from the host country of education
to the other developed country in order to work there. For several reasons, this assumption is
not too restrictive. Firstly, after having studied several years in the host country, graduates are
already (at least partly) integrated into their host society. They have built up social and, perhaps,
family ties, and are thus attached to their host country. Secondly, during the studies in the host
country, graduates are acquiring country-specic skills, such as language skills and knowledge of the
institutions, regulations and laws in their host country. This component of human capital receives
a higher return in the host country than in the other developed country. Thirdly, and related to the
previous point, graduates usually nd it easier to integrate into the labour market of the their host
country than of another developed country. In addition, the host country might facilitate visa and
work-permit processes if the applicant has successfully graduated from a domestic university. For
instance, Germany allows foreign graduates from a German university to stay on in the country
for one year in order to nd a job (see Chalo and Lemaitre, 2009, for similar regulations in other
OECD countries).
6Each government maximises its net benet, or rent, from oering higher educa-
tion to international students,
Ri = Wi + Ni[ti   c(qi)]   F(qi); (2)
where Ni and Wi stand for the number of international students in country i (with
N1 + N2 = N), and the expected wage sum, or tax base, generated by the interna-
tional students who continue to stay and work in country i. A country gains from
international students, as they pay tuition fees Niti and generate expected tax rev-
enues Wi. These benets are diminished by the variable and xed costs of education
c(qi) and F(qi).
Timing Decisions take place in three stages. In the rst stage, the two governments
simultaneously choose education qualities q1 and q2. In the second stage, the two
governments set tuition fees t1 and t2. In the third stage, ROW students decide
whether to study in country 1 or in country 2. Each government maximises its net
benet (2), and each individual maximises their expected income net of taxes and
tuition fees %(w + aqi)   ti (i.e., expected net income minus tuition fees).
3 Quality and Tuition Fee Competition
We solve this three-stage game recursively and look for the subgame-perfect equi-
librium. Hence, we begin by analysing the migration choices of the ROW students.
Migration Decisions In the third stage, each ROW student decides whether to
migrate to, and study in, country 1 or country 2, given tuition fees (t1;t2) and
educational qualities (q1;q2). Comparing the individual net benet %(w + aq1)   t1
and %(w+aq2) t2 reveals that individuals choose country 2 (country 1) if and only





where q := q2   q1 denotes the regional quality dierential.
Without loss of generality, we may assume country 2 is the high quality provider,
i.e., q > 0. (We exclude the case q2 = q1, since this can never be a subgame-perfect
equilibrium, as we will discuss below.) Hence, all students would obviously enrol in
country 2 if the tuition fee t2 were less than or equal to tuition fee t1 (because then
7^ a  0  a). For t2 > t1, only individuals with a high ability a  ^ a nd it benecial
to study in country 2, since their high ability allows them to exploit the higher
educational quality eectively and to recoup the higher private costs of education.
The other students choose the low-price study programme in country 1. Thus, the
number of international students is N1 = ^ aN in the low quality country 1, and
N2 = (1   ^ a)N in high quality country 2.




















(1 + ^ a)q2

, (5)
where the threshold value ^ a is given by (3). The sums comprise the expected number
of foreign-born workers, p^ aN and p(1   ^ a)N, and the corresponding average labour
income, w + 1
2^ aq1 and w + 1
2 (1 + ^ a)q2. The terms 1
2^ aq1 and 1
2 (1 + ^ a)q2 capture the
average human capital of foreign-born workers, or educational quality premium, in
country 1 and 2.
Recall that we excluded the case q2 = q1 above. The reason is that equal quality
levels in the two countries can never be an equilibrium. With q2 = q1, tuition fee com-
petition would be ruinous, as all students would simply migrate to the country that
oers lower fees. But then each country would gain from choosing an educational
quality that diers from its neighbour's, thereby weakening the ensuing tuition fee
competition.7 For completeness, we prove the non-existence of the symmetric solu-
tion in the Appendix (see the proof of Lemma 1).
Tuition Fee Competition Having analysed the students' migration choices, we
now turn to the tuition fee competition in the second stage. Using the student
demands N1 and N2 and the resulting wage sums W1 and W2, captured by (4) and
(5), we rearrange the objective functions of the two governments:









+ t1   c(q1)

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variable net rent r1
  F(q1), (6)







(1 + ^ a)q2

+ t2   c(q2)

| {z }
variable net rent r2
  F(q2). (7)
7This argument is completely in line with standard results in the literature on vertical product
dierentiation, in which rms dierentiate product qualities in order to relax price competition.
8The terms in braces capture the countries' expected variable net benet from each
student, consisting of expected future tax payments and current tuition fees less
variable education costs. The last term in each line stands for the xed costs of
education.
Each government i chooses the tuition fee ti that maximises rent Ri, thereby
taking the educational qualities (q1;q2), which were determined in the rst stage,
and the other government's tuition fee tj as given. When raising the tuition fees,
government i faces a trade-o. Obviously, the students who still migrate to country
i pay more for their education. Also, as higher fees deter students, the variable
public spending on education decreases. However, fewer students move to country i
and pay tuition fees. Moreover, the decrease in student numbers reduces the future
wage sum and thus tax revenues. Balancing these opposing eects gives country
i's best response function tbr
i (tj;q1;q2), which follows from the rst-order condition
dRi=dti = 0 (see the Appendix for details).
The equilibrium tuition fees (t
1;t

















%[2%q   pq1 + (q1 + 2q2)]
p + 3%
  pw. (9)
The resulting tuition fee dierential
t











ects the fact that the high-quality country charges higher tuition fees for two obvi-
ous reasons. Firstly, the country that oers a higher educational quality strengthens
the demand for its education system. This enables the high-quality country to raise
the tuition fees above the fee level of its competitor. Secondly, the high-quality
country 2 passes the higher costs on to the students.






which follows directly from inserting the tuition fee dierential (10) into the ability
threshold (3). Importantly, the equilibrium threshold level ^ a does not depend on the
educational quality dierential q. That is, every change in the quality dierential is
oset by a proportional change in the equilibrium tuition fees so that the allocation
of students to the two countries remains unaltered.
9Educational Quality Competition In the rst stage, government i chooses the
educational quality qi that maximises its net benet Ri.8 Each government takes the
quality of education abroad as given and anticipates the implication of its quality
decision for the tuition fee competition at the second stage. Taking the equilibrium
tuition fees (t
1;t
2) and the threshold value ^ a into account, the marginal eect of






























Since the marginal impact is always negative, the optimal educational quality of
country 1 is q
1 = 0.9 The intuition for this solution is straightforward. Any in-
crease in the educational quality of the low-quality country not only drives up both
xed and variable costs, it also intensies the tuition fee competition in the second
stage because of the diminished quality dierential. As a result, the benet per stu-
dent that accrues to country 1 declines. Consequently, the government of country
1 dierentiates the educational quality as much as possible to relax the tuition fee
competition.
The circumstances are dierent for country 2. Now the optimal quality of edu-































8International students indeed shape quality decisions for several reasons. Firstly, many coun-
tries outside the English speaking world have introduced specic international programmes taught
in English and geared towards the needs of foreign students. Also, many programmes in English
speaking countries, particularly at the postgraduate level, are de facto set up for foreign students,
as they form the overwhelming majority of participants. Furthermore, many universities specically
improve the quality of the education that foreign students receive by oering them support pro-
grammes. Universities provide, for instance, additional tutorials for students from specic countries
and transition courses that enables foreign students to successfully integrate into the host country's
higher education systems.
9A quality level qi = 0 must not be interpreted as no quality at all. It rather means that the
country's university just fulls the minimum requirements for higher education.
10The second-order condition is fullled as d2R2=dq2
2 =  @2F=@q2
2 < 0.
10An increase in the quality of education in the high-quality country 2 raises the human
capital of future skilled workers, leading to higher wages and higher expected tax
payments. It also widens the gap between the two countries' educational systems
which, in turn, weakens tuition fee competition and drives up tuition fees. Higher
future tax payments and current tuition fees means that country 2's variable benet
from each student increases, despite growing variable costs. This positive impact on
the variable net rent r2 has to be balanced against the rise in xed costs.
The resulting asymmetric equilibrium is summarised in
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, one host country of the ROW students provides a higher
quality of education and charges higher tuition fees than the other host country. That
is, q
2 > q
1 = 0 and t
2 > t
1. The high-quality country attracts the brightest students
from the international pool of talent, i.e., those with a 2 [^ a;1]. This equilibrium is
determined up to the permutation of the two countries across the two indices.
Proof. See the Appendix.
4 Competition in a Changing Environment
Now we turn to the question of how a changing socio-economic environment, as
highlighted in the Motivation, aects the international competition for the pool of
talent. More specically, we consider three scenarios: an increase in (i) the stay rate of
foreign students, (ii) the income prospects of graduates in developing countries, and
(iii) the size of the talent pool. We show how these changes aect educational quality,
tuition fees, and the allocation of students. This analysis helps us to understand
potential future trends in higher education. In addition, it enables us to assess
possible consequences of these changes for the sending countries of talented students
in Section 5.1. We begin by analysing the impact of a change in the stay rate.
4.1 Stay Rate of Foreign Students
Technological, societal or political developments can explain changes in the stay rate
of foreign students in their host countries.11 Proposition 1 summarises the impact
11Technological progress, for instance, has led to plummeting communication and travel costs. As
a result, people who work abroad can keep in touch with their relatives and friends at home more
easily and at lower costs. This reduces the psychological and nancial burden of staying abroad
11of an increase in the stay rate p on quality levels, tuition fees, and the allocation of
students.
Proposition 1 An increase in the stay rate of foreign students after graduation in
the host countries of education
(i) raises the educational quality q
2 and the quality dierential q (i.e., dq
2=dp >
0 and dq=dp > 0), but it does not aect the educational quality q
1 = 0;
(ii) has an ambiguous eect on the tuition fees t
1 and t
2 and on the tuition fee
dierential t. In particular,
dt
dp
T 0 , "q;p + "
;p + "
;%"%;p T 0, (14)
where "q;p := (dq=dp)(p=q) > 0, "
;p := (@
=@p)(p=




) > 0 and "%;p := (@%=@p)(p=%)  0. (Recall that 
 is dened
in (10));
(iii) raises the share of foreign students who study in the high-quality country (i.e.,
d(1   ^ a)=dp > 0).
Proof. See the Appendix.
We relegate the proof to the Appendix and focus now on the economic intuition.
To elucidate the impact of the stay rate p on the equilibrium outcome, we begin by
considering a special case, which highlights the main mechanisms, and turn to the
more general setting afterwards.
Special case: ROW =  and 
 = 1.
In this special case, we have % = 1   . That is, the parameter % and thus the
expected net labour income of a student, E fwag, are independent of the stay rate
p (see (1)), also implying "%;p = 0. Consequently, the allocation of the students to
the two countries, ^ a, only depends on the ratio of the tuition fee dierential to the
quality dierential t=p. That is, there is no direct eect of the stay rate on the
allocation of students, i.e., (@^ a=@%)(@%=@p) = 0 (see (3)). Then, the stay rate aects
the equilibrium allocation only via its impact on the countries' policies, which we
now discuss.
after graduation, and can thus boost the stay rate of foreign students. Also, recent measures of
developed countries to open up labour market access to foreign graduates contributes to higher
stay rates.
12Education Quality A higher stay rate p causes a direct tax revenue eect on
educational quality q
2. It increases the expected future tax payment of a foreign
student in country 2. More importantly, as fewer students leave their host coun-
try after graduation, the positive impact of a higher educational quality on the
expected per-student contribution to the future tax revenues is reinforced (i.e.,
@2W 
2=(@q
2@p) > 0). This strengthens country 2's incentive to invest in educational
quality. It thus raises its quality level q
2.
At the same time, country 1 continues to face an incentive to dierentiate its
quality level from that of its opponent as much as possible in order to soften the
ensuing tuition fee competition. This incentive, which is discussed in Section 3, does
not wither away with increasing stay rates. Therefore, country 1 sticks to its quality
level q
1 = 0, and the quality dierential q widens as the stay rate p increases.
Tuition Fees The impact of the stay rate on tuition fees is ambiguous. In partic-
ular, using t = 










where the elasticities are dened in Proposition 1. In our special case, the third
term in the brackets vanishes as "%;p = 0. Then, the overall eect of the stay rate on
tuition fees can be decomposed into two components. Firstly, there is an educational
quality eect on tuition fees. The widening quality gap that follows from a higher
stay rate weakens tuition fee competition. The two countries face an incentive to
raise their tuition fees. This incentive is particularly strong for country 2, which
already charges higher tuition fees. It can now exploit its enhanced market power,
since it provides an even higher educational quality. Consequently, the education
quality eect drives up tuition fee t
2 by more than t
1, and thus widens the tuition
fee dierential t. Formally, "q;p > 0 captures this eect.
Secondly, there is a direct tax revenue eect on tuition fees. Students become
more valuable because their expected tax payments in their host country increase
with the stay rate p. In response, the two countries face an incentive to lower their
tuition fees in order to attract more foreign students. This is particularly true for
country 2. Its opportunity costs of losing students in terms of foregone tax revenues
are particularly high because its students build up more human capital, and thus will
receive higher wages and pay more taxes than those in country 1. Hence, the direct
tax revenue eect induces country 2 to cut its tuition fee by more than country 1.
This eect reduces the tuition fee dierential. Formally, it is re
ected by "
;p < 0.
13The opposing educational quality eect and direct tax revenue eect are already
sucient to conclude that the impact of a higher stay rate on tuition fees and the
tuition fee dierential is ambiguous. More specically, we nd that
dt
dp





p + 2%   
=:  ; (16)
where "F;q := (@2F=@q2)q=(@F=@q) stands for the elasticity of marginal xed costs.
Improving the quality of education is the more expensive, the greater is the elasticity
"F;q. Hence, a high elasticity curbs the rise of educational quality q
2 in response to an
increase of the stay rate p. This in turn weakens the educational quality eect. If the
the elasticity "F;q exceeds the threshold level  , then the educational quality eect
is so weak that the direct tax revenue eect dominates. Under these circumstances,
the tuition fee dierential declines along with tuition fees. Otherwise, the tuition fee
dierential increases.
Allocation of Students In response to a higher stay rate, the high-quality coun-
try 2 raises its educational quality q
2 further. This strengthens its market power in
the tuition fee competition. Country 2 exploits its improved position by grabbing a
larger share of the pool of talent whose value to the host country has gone up. The
low-quality country 1 loses students. Formally, a decline in the ratio of the tuition
fee dierential to the quality dierential causes this shift in the allocation of students
in favour of country 2 and at the expense of country 1.
Further Eects in the General Case We now return to our more general
setting with a parameter % that varies with the stay rate p (i.e., "%;p  0). In this
case, an expected income eect emerges in addition to the aforementioned eects.
Now, the expected net labour income increases with the stay rate (dEfwag=dp > 0).
This positive impact of an increase in the stay rate on labour income is the greater,
the higher is the educational quality. Thus, a rise in the stay rate reinforces the
incentives to study in the high-quality country 2, which has three implications.
Firstly, the demand for university places shifts in favour of country 2 and at the
expense of country 1 for given policies (q1;q2) and (t1;t2). Thus, the expected income
eect on demand reinforces the decline in the ability threshold ^ a. Secondly, facing
a growing demand, country 2 nds it even more benecial to invest in its quality
of education. Thus, the expected income eect on educational quality reinforces the
positive impact of the stay rate on educational quality q
2 and the quality dierential
q.
14Thirdly, growing demand for university places in country 2 strengthens the in-
centives for country 2 to further raise its tuition fee for given quality levels (q1;q2).
This relaxes the pressure on country 1, which is now more likely to increase its
tuition fee, too (note that the fees t
1 and t
2 are strategic complements, as rivals'
choices usually are in the case of price competition), albeit to a lesser extent than
country 2. As the expected income eect on tuition fees exhibits a stronger upward
pressure on t
2 than on t
1, it fosters a larger regional gap in tuition fees. Formally,
"
;%"%;p > 0 captures this impact (see (14)). This direct eect is even reinforced, as
the expected income eect drives up the quality dierential, and thus strengthens
the educational quality eect on tuition fees. Again, this mechanism raises tuition
fees and the tuition fee dierential. However, the overall eect of the stay rate on
tuition fees and the tuition fee dierential remains ambiguous.
All in all, the conclusions in the more general setting are qualitatively the same
as in the special case. In particular, the educational quality q
2 and the quality
dierential on the one hand and the tuition fees and the tuition fee dierential on
the other hand can move in opposite directions, as stated in the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 If the direct tax revenue eect on tuition fees is suciently strong,
then an increase in the stay rate of foreign students after graduation widens the
educational quality gap (i.e., dq=dp > 0), while the tuition fees of the two coun-





In the special case, this outcome occurs if the elasticity condition "F;q <   holds.
For example, the quadratic cost function F(q) = q2,  > 0, fulls this elasticity
condition, as   > 1 and, in this case, "F;q = 1.12 Also, if the tuition fee dierential
declines, then the tuition fees do so, too.13
4.2 Income in ROW
A feature of the present framework is that students can earn higher net wages in
their host countries than in their home countries. This feature re
ects the fact that
the host countries represent developed countries, while ROW stands for developing
12Note that, in an interior solution, ^ a < 1 ,  < p + 2% holds. Then, the second term of   is
positive (see (16)). The rst term is obviously greater than one (see again (16)). So   > 1 results.
13From (8) and (9) follows that t
2 = 2t
1 + pw. Then, d(t
2   t
1)=dp = dt
1=dp + w =
0:5(dt
2=dp + w), and thus d(t
2   t
1)=dp < 0 implies both dt
1=dp < 0 and dt
2=dp < 0.
15regions. In this section, we consider the impact of the ROW's catching up with the
developed countries in terms of graduate income, as we observe in the case of, e.g.,
China or India. Analytically, we capture this narrowing wage gap between developed
and less developed countries by a marginal increase in 
. The following proposition
summarises the resulting comparative statics.
Proposition 2 An increase in the graduate income in the home countries of the
students
(i) raises the educational quality q




 > 0), but it does not aect the educational quality q
1 = 0;
(ii) raises the tuition fees t
1 and t
2 and the tuition fee dierential t (i.e.,
dt
i=d
 > 0 and dt=d
 > 0);
(iii) has an ambiguous eect on the share of foreign students who study in the
high-quality country:
d(1   ^ a)
d

R 0 , 3   p T 0. (17)
Proof. See the Appendix.
A growing graduate income in ROW increases the expected net labour income.
Again, this positive impact on wages is the larger, the higher is the educational
quality. Thus, a rise in the wage parameter 
 reinforces individual incentives to
study in the high-quality country 2. This expected income eect is the very same in
qualitative terms as the one discussed in the general scenario of Section 4.1, and so
are the implications.
Firstly, the demand for university places in the high-quality country rises for
given policies (q1;q2) and (t1;t2). Secondly, as students become more inclined to
study in the high-quality country, the government of country 2 benets even more
from investing in its educational quality (i.e., [@2W 
2=(@q
2@%)]@%=@
 > 0). Again,
the educational quality q
2 and the quality dierential q increase. (Needless to
say, the quality q
1 = 0 is again not aected, for reasons already explained above.)
Thirdly, the expected income eect directly pushes up tuition fees and the tuition
fee dierential, as discussed in Section 4.1. This eect is again reinforced by the
educational quality eect on tuition fees, as the quality dierential widens.
Note that the ambiguity about the changes in tuition fees in Proposition 1 is
caused by the direct tax revenue eect on tuition fees, which works in favour of
16lower and converging fees. But exactly this eect does not have a counterpart in
the current context. Therefore, Proposition 2 provides an unambiguous result about
tuition fees.
By contrast, the conclusion about the share of students in the high-quality coun-
try is no longer clear-cut. Without the direct tax revenue eect on tuition fees, there
is no force that counteracts the rise in tuition fees and the tuition fee dierential
in response to a larger value of 
. Hence, the surge in the tuition fee dierential,
which drives students to the low-quality country, can be so drastic that it more than
compensates for the rise in 
 and the induced increase in the quality dierential,
which pushes students to the high-quality country. Then, the share of students in
the high-quality country falls in equilibrium. Otherwise, this share rises.
4.3 Size of the Pool of Talents
In the light of increasing international student mobility, we nally analyse how an
enlarged pool of international talent aects the subgame-perfect policies and the
allocation of students.
Proposition 3 An increase in the size of the international pool of talent
(i) raises the educational quality q
2 and the quality dierential q (i.e.,
dq
2=dN > 0 and dq=dN > 0), but does not aect the quality q
1 = 0;
(ii) raises the tuition fees t
1 and t
2 and the tuition fee dierential t (i.e.,
dt
i=dN > 0 and dt=dN > 0);
(iii) has no impact on the share of students who study in the high-quality country
(i.e., d(1   ^ a)=dN = 0).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Firstly, there is a direct demand eect on the educational quality. A larger inter-
national student population raises the marginal variable rent of a quality increase
in the high-quality country 2. That is, d2r2=dq2dN > 0 (see (13)). As the xed costs
of quality improvements remain the same and are now divided over a greater num-
ber of students, investing in educational quality becomes more benecial in country
2. Consequently, country 2 increases its educational quality q
2. Its opponent again
leaves its quality level at q
1 = 0, for the same reasons as discussed above. Thus the
quality dierential between the two countries increases.
17Secondly, there is the educational quality eect on tuition fees. Again, a widening
quality gap weakens tuition fee competition and enables both countries to charge
higher fees, and leads to a larger tuition fee dierential, as discussed above. Finally,
as there is neither the direct tax revenue eect nor the expected income eect at
work in the present scenario, each country's share of the international talent pool
remains unchanged. Without the expected income eect, an increase in the size of
the talent pool aects the allocation of students only indirectly through changes in
policies. However, without the direct tax revenue eect, the ratio of the tuition fee
dierential to the educational quality dierential (i.e., 
) remains unaltered, and
thus the allocation of students, see (10).
4.4 Comparison
Table 1 summarises the impact of the socio-economic changes analysed in this sec-
tion. In all three scenarios, the demand for university places and the number of future
tax payers increase in the high-quality country for given policies (q1;q2) and (t1;t2).
Consequently, country 2 nds it more benecial to invest in educational quality. As
a result, educational quality q
2 and, along with it, the quality dierential, increase
in all three scenarios.
In contrast to this unambiguous result, the trend of tuition fees is less clear-
cut. Both an increase in the income prospects in developing countries 
 and the
size of the talent pool N drives up the tuition fees and the tuition fee dierential.
But the overall eect on tuition fees of a rise in the stay rate p is ambiguous. In
particular, tuition fees and the tuition fee dierential can diminish. The reason for
this outcome is that an increasing stay rate makes foreign students more valuable
particularly in the long run, i.e., as future tax payers. This restrains the countries'
appetites for charging high tuition fees, which would deter students. There is no
similarly restraining motive at work in the other two scenarios.
An increase in the stay rate denitely shifts the equilibrium allocation of stu-
dents in favour of the high-quality country 2. This conclusion stems from the fact
that, while the quality gap clearly widens, the tuition fee dierential increases only
moderately, if at all. Thus, the high-quality country becomes more attractive. In the
other two scenarios, particularly the high-quality country faces a stronger incentive
to raise tuition, and the tuition fee dierential tends to widen more drastically. As
a result, the share of students in the high-quality country remains constant (if the
size of the talent pool increases) or might even fall (if earnings prospects in ROW
improve).
18Education quality Tuition fees Student allocation
Increase of ...
... stay rate (p ") q2 ", q1 = 0, change of t ^ a #
q " ambiguous
... ROW income (
 ") q2 ", q1 = 0, ti ", t " change of ^ a
q " ambiguous
... size of talent pool (N ") q2 ", q1 = 0, ti " t " ^ a unchanged
q "
Table 1: Summary of comparative statics eects.
5 Implications
Having explored how a changing environment aects educational quality, tuition fees,
and the allocation of students, we now discuss some implications of our analysis. We
begin by exploring how our analysis contributes to the discussion about brain drain
and brain gain. Afterwards, we brie
y sketch how the non-cooperative equilibrium
diverges from the ecient outcome, and why it does.
5.1 Brain Drain and Brain Gain
From the perspective of the developing countries, a prime question is whether the
socio-ecomonic changes analysed in Section 4 yield a brain drain or a brain gain. That
is, the question is whether these changes increase or decrease the human capital in
developing countries after returning graduates are taken into account. The ndings in
the previous sections shed some light on this question and imply novel mechanisms
that generate brain drain or brain gain. In the following, we focus on only two
scenarios, a rise in the stay rate and in the size of the talent pool.
Stay Rate First of all, an increase in the stay rate p reduces the number of inter-
nationally educated graduates who return to ROW, which constitutes a quantitative
brain drain. At the same time, an increase in the stay rate alters the competition be-
tween the host countries for foreign students (see Section 4.1). Firstly, a larger share
of the talent pool is educated in the high-quality country 2 (i.e., d(1   ^ a)=dp > 0).
Secondly, the educational quality in country 2 increases, while the quality in country
191 remains unchanged. Both eects push up the average human capital of graduates
who return to ROW, which constitutes a qualitative brain gain. Overall, ROW suers
from a quantitative brain drain, but it benets from a qualitative brain gain.14
Size of the Talent Pool For a given return rate (1   p), the number of inter-
nationally educated graduates in ROW apparently increases with the number of
students sent abroad, N. This increase constitutes a quantitative brain gain. (Of
course, this is only a per-capita brain gain if the increase in the number of inter-
national students N results from a rising student share of the population in ROW,
and not merely from population growth.)
In addition, an increase in the number of international students N alters the
competition between the host countries for ROW-born students (see Section 4.3).
Country 2 now oers a higher educational quality q2, while the educational quality
in country 1 remains unchanged at q
1 = 0. The allocation of students within the
host regions remains unchanged as well. Consequently, the average human capital of
the returning graduates increases, implying a qualitative brain gain. Overall, ROW
benets from both a quantitative and qualitative brain gain.
The novelty of these brain gain and brain drain eects is that they are driven by
policy changes in the developed countries. By contrast, the `standard' economic liter-
ature on brain drain and brain gain stresses how migration shapes private incentives
to invest in education (e.g., Stark et al. 1997, 1998). In this sense, our model comple-
ments the existing literature on brain drain and brain gain by explicitly considering
the host countries' competition for talent from developing countries.
5.2 International Competition and Eciency
In the present paper, we focus on the positive analysis of the international compe-
tition for talent and the eects of socio-economic changes on the subgame-perfect
equilibrium. From a normative perspective, an interesting question is whether the
competition for international talent is ecient. That is, in the current context, the
question is whether non-cooperative decisions on education qualities and tuition fees
14Haupt, Krieger and Lange (2010a) analyse qualitative brain gain and quantitative brain drain
eects in a framework with only one developed country that hosts students from a developing
country. As in the current framework, these students stay in their host country with a certain
probability. Haupt, Krieger and Lange (2010a) show that aggregate and per-capita human capital
in the developing country increases with the stay rate of students in the developed host country
as long as this stay rate is not too large.
20in developed countries maximise the aggregate surplus of educating international
talent. Not surprisingly, the answer is, in general, no.
While host countries in the decentralised setting maximise their net benet from
educating foreign students, a benevolent social planner would choose an allocation of
students to the two host countries and educational qualities so that the graduates'
aggregate gross income net of educational costs is maximised. An earlier version
of this paper provided a welfare comparison between the rst-best solution of the
social planner and the subgame-perfect equilibrium (see Haupt, Krieger and Lange,
2010b). In the following, we will only summarise the quintessence of this analysis.
First of all, the student allocation in the decentralised equilibrium is, in general,
inecient. In the non-cooperative equilibrium, the allocation follows from govern-
ment choices that balance each country's trade-o between additional fee and tax
revenues on the one hand and higher education costs on the other hand. The ecient
allocation, instead, results from balancing the trade-o between a higher aggregate
wage sum on the one hand and higher aggregate education costs on the other hand.
To see the implications of these dierent trade-os, suppose that the quality
of education does not aect its variable costs (which is the case if  = 0). Then,
in the rst-best solution, all students are apparently allocated to the high-quality
country 2. This allocation maximises aggregate gross wages and avoids any xed
costs in country 1. It is thus certainly welfare-superior to a solution that allocates
any students to region 1. In the decentralised equilibrium, however, demand for
the low-quality country 1 is strictly positive. Imperfect competition implies some
market power for each host country, which allows country 1 to successfully attract
some international students, although this is actually inecient.
If the quality of education aects the variable costs (which is the case if  is
suciently large), then allocating the less talented students to country 1 becomes
worthwhile for the benevolent planner. Thereby, overall education costs can be re-
duced because a lower quality leads to lower costs per student. The welfare compar-
ison is then ambiguous. The allocation of students in the decentralised equilibrium
can, in principle, deviate from the rst-best solution in both directions. That is, in
the non-cooperative equilibrium, too many as well as too few students might end
up in the high-quality country 2.
The educational quality that results from the competition for the international
pool of talent is, in general, inecient as well. While the rst-best solution for
the low quality level qo
1 coincides with the corresponding level in the decentralised
equilibrium (i.e., qo
1 = q
1 = 0), the rst-best solution for the high quality level qo
2
21does not, for two reasons. Firstly, even for identical allocations of students in the
decentralised setting and the rst-best solution, the objectives of the competing
countries are not aligned with the objective of the benevolent planner, as explored
above. Secondly, the allocation of students in the decentralised equilibrium is likely
to deviate from the rst-best solution, as argued above. This adds another distortion
to the incentives for the host countries to invest in quality. Hence, depending on the
parameters in the model (particularly the stay rate of students, the income-tax
rate in the host countries and the variable costs of education), educational quality
q2 can deviate from the rst-best solution in both directions. That is, in the non-
cooperative equilibrium, the high-quality country 2 may invest too much or too little
in the quality of education.
The subgame-perfect equilibrium is, in general, inecient, irrespective of the
stay rate. In contrast, Demange and Fenge (2010) show that, in their model, two
non-cooperative countries choose ecient educational quality levels if all foreign
students return to their home countries after graduation. Their model diers from
our approach in three major respects. Firstly, all students are native to one of the
two competing countries. That is, there is no `ROW'. Secondly, there is no tuition
fee competition because tuition fees are such that education costs are fully covered.
Third, there are no xed costs of providing educational quality. As a result, if all
students return to their home country, there are no educational externalities and thus
no opportunities to free-ride, and the two countries have no incentive to compete
for foreign students.
In our setting, by contrast, ineciency prevails, no matter whether students re-
turn to their home country or not. In any case, the governments do not take the
students' benet into account and, even if all students leave after graduation, still
compete for foreign students as tuition fee payers. However, the dierent conclusions
are not surprising. After all, we analyse quality and tuition-fee competition for stu-
dents from outside of two competing countries, whereas Demange and Fenge (2010)
consider quality competition only, and only for students who are native to one of
the competing countries. The results are therefore not perfectly comparable; in fact,
the two papers are complementary.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analysed the competition between developed countries for
the pool of students from the developing world. Developed countries try to attract
22foreign students not only because these students pay tuition fees, but also because
they provide long-term benets to the societies of the developed world if they con-
tinue to stay in their host countries. In our model, these long-term benets were
captured by additional tax revenues. However, modelling these benets as human
capital spillovers would have led to the same qualitative results.
In equilibrium, the two countries provide dierent quality levels of higher educa-
tion to relax the ensuing tuition fee competition. That is, one country charges high
tuition fees for a high quality education, while the other country charges low tuition
fees for a low quality education.
To analyse potential trends in developed and developing countries, we explored
three scenarios: an increase in (i) the stay rate of foreign students after graduation,
(ii) the income prospects in developing countries, and (iii) the size of the talent pool.
In all three scenarios, the quality dierential and quality of education in the high-
quality country increase. Only in the second and third scenario do tuition fees and
the tuition fee dierential rise, too. In these scenarios, higher education becomes
unambiguously more dierentiated in terms of both quality and tuition fees. By
contrast, tuition fees and the tuition fee dierential may decline as the stay rate
increases.
We have also shown that the induced policy adaptations to these socio-economic
changes lead to brain drain and brain gain eects. For instance, an increase in the
stay rate of foreign students causes a quantitative brain drain and a qualitative brain
gain to the sending countries.
Our model could be generalised in various ways. For instance, students from
developing countries might prefer one host country over the other for private or
cultural reasons, resulting in imperfect mobility with respect to the potential desti-
nations.15 Then competition would be less erce, and quality dierentiation would
be less extreme. However, the fundamental characteristics of the equilibrium and
the comparative statics would not change qualitatively.
Furthermore, we have assumed that the stay rate is not aected by other vari-
ables, such as the quality of education or expected income. For instance, the stay
15`Pure' two-country models with student migration usually feature imperfect student mobility
(e.g., Boadway, Marceau and Marchand, 1996; B uttner and Schwager, 2004; G erard, 2007; Krieger
and Lange, 2010; Lange, 2009). However, in this case, countries try to attract students from each
other, and these students might be strongly attached to their home country. By contrast, we
consider students who leave their home country anyway. These students are then more likely
to be indierent between dierent destination countries with respect to their private or cultural
preferences.
23rates could positively depend on educational quality. Students who attend an elite
university and have high potential earnings in the host country might have a higher
propensity to stay than graduates from a low-quality university. With dierentiated
educational systems, the stay rates would then dier between host countries. Again,
this should not aect international competition and its implications fundamentally.
When making their decisions, governments would just take into account that rais-
ing educational quality causes a further marginal benet, as it increases the stay
rate. But they would still dierentiate the qualities of education to relax tuition fee
competition. Only the equilibrium degree of dierentiation is likely to change. The
comparative-static analysis should not be aected qualitatively.
Our analysis points to some interesting avenues for future research. For instance,
instead of the countries deciding simultaneously, they could make their quality,
or market entry, choices sequentially (e.g., by launching international study pro-
grammes). Countries would then have an incentive to spend resources to lead the
way and obtain a rst-mover advantage by choosing the more protable quality level.
Furthermore, it would be worthwhile considering an endogenous immigration pol-
icy which determines the stay rates of graduates. Countries could implement some
measures to foster social integration and to facilitate the labour market access of
graduates (e.g., by promoting permanent residency). More and more OECD coun-
tries already make use of this option, and it would be interesting to elaborate the
link between immigration policy and the competition for students in more detail.
Adding admission standards to the choice set of countries, as, for example, in De
Fraja and Iossa (2002), may also enrich further research.
Appendix
Tuition Fee Competition (Section 3)
Country 1 chooses t1 to maximise R1 according to (6), taking t2 and quality levels













  pw + c(q1) = 0, (18)
from which the best-response function t1 = tbr
1 (t2;q1;q2) can be directly derived:










24Following from (7), the rst order condition for tuition fees chosen by country 2
and the best-response function t2 = tbr













  pw + c(q2) + %q = 0 (20)
and
t2 = 2t1 +









































which nally can be reduced to (8) and (9). Note that the second order conditions
for optimal tuition fees in the two countries are given by pq1   2%q < 0 and
 pq2   2%q < 0.
Proof of Lemma 1 and Non-existence of Symmetric Equilibrium
To show that a symmetric solution cannot exist, we rst analyse tuition fee com-
petition, assuming that the two countries had chosen identical educational qualities
q1 = q2 =: q in the rst stage. Further assume that students who are indierent
between the two countries study in each of the two countries with probability 0:5.
For undierentiated quality levels, the variable net rent then amounts to
rijq=0 =
8
> > > <
> > > :
W + N(ti   c(q)) if ti < tj;
1
2[W + N(ti   c(q))] if ti = tj;
0 if ti > tj;
(24)
where W = pN
R 1
0 (w + aq)da = pN(w + q=2). The xed costs of providing quality
are already sunk and therefore irrelevant for tuition fee competition. Countries have
an incentive to undercut their competitor in order to attract all foreign students as
long as ri is positive, thereby engaging in a race-to-the-bottom leading to tuition
fees t1 = t2 = q   p(w + q=2) and ri = 0.
This result of the second stage aects, in turn, the overall rent Ri after taking
quality competition into account. If the variable net rent in (6) and (7) is zero,
25only the xed costs remain, i.e., Ri =  F(q), i = 1;2. Then educational qualities
q1 = q2 > 0 cannot constitute an equilibrium. One country could unilaterally deviate
and choose a slightly lower educational quality, thereby increasing its net benet Ri
because xed costs F(q) decline and tuition fees can always be set such that the
variable net rent ri is at least zero.
Next we show that q1 = q2 = 0, implying R1 = R2 = 0, cannot be an equilibrium
either. The reason is that one country, say country 2, can then gain from unilaterally
raising its quality to q
2, while the other country sticks to q
1 = 0, the optimal
response to q
2. That is, R2 > 0 for q
2 > q
1 = 0. Moreover, R1 > 0, too, for
q
2 > q
1 = 0. First we show that net variable rents are strictly positive for an
interior solution of the allocation of foreign students ^ a. That is, we prove that
ri(q1;q2)  Wi + Ni[ti   c(qi)] > 0, i 2 f1;2g. Variable net rents are




















Using equilibrium values t
1, t
2 and ^ a, which are dened in (8), (9) and (11),
and imply t
2 > t
1, we nd that
r1(q1;q2) > 0 if pq1   2%q < 0; (27)





(p + 2%   ) > 0: (28)
While the second order condition for the optimal t
1 guarantees r1(q1;q2) > 0,
a strictly positive demand for education in country 2 (i.e., (1   ^ a) = (p + 2%  
)=(p + 3%) > 0) implies r2(q1;q2) > 0. With q
2 > q
1 = 0, country 1 generates a
strictly positive rent R1 > 0 (see (6)) because F(0) = 0 and r1(q
1;q
2) > 0.
Country 2 also generates a strictly positive rent R2, as lim
q2!0R(q2) = 0 implies
q

2 = argmaxR2(q2) > 0 , R2(q

2) > 0: (29)
The equilibrium allocation of students is ^ a. From (3) follows that all individuals
with ability a  ^ a study in the higher-quality country 2, while all students with
a < ^ a study in country 1.
Proof of Proposition 1
First of all, note that
@%(p)
@p
= (1   )   (1   ROW)
  0 (30)
26can be signed unambiguously by Assumption 1. This nding can be used to get,





 + ] + 3
@%
@p
(p + 3%)2  0, (31)
and thus @(1   ^ a)=@p  0. This proves part (iii) of Proposition 1.
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where the last inequality results from @%=@p  0 (see (30)), @^ a=@p  0 (see (31))
and 1   ^ a  0.
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, (36)
where "q;p := (dq=dp)(p=q) > 0, "
;p := (@
=@p)(p=
) < 0, and "%;p :=









p ( + 2%) + 3%2
(p + 3%)
2 > 0. (37)
The derivative (36) directly implies (14), which proves part (ii) of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2

































and, using (11) and the fact that d%=d




> 0 , 3%p + 6%
2 + 2p + 3% > 0, (40)
where the last inequality always holds.


















where @t=@q = 
(p;%) > 0 (see (10)), dq=d
 > 0 (see (38)-(40)), @%=@
 =




p( + 2%) + 3%2
(p + 3%)2 q
 > 0 (42)
(see (10) and (37)). Furthermore, using (1) and (11) yields
d(1   ^ a)
d







T 0 , 3   p T 0, (43)
which proves part (iii) of Proposition 2.
Proof Proposition 3




































(p + 2%)(1   ^ a
)
2 > 0, (45)
which proves part (i) of Propostion 3.









where @t=@q = 
(p;%) > 0 (see (10)) and @q=@N > 0 (see (44) and (45)).
Part (iii) follows directly from (10), as t is independent of N.
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